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On 1 December 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council invited the High 
Representative to propose a review of the EU’s Crisis Management 
Procedures (CMP). The original  document from 2003 had lost much 
of its relevance as a result of the changing post-Lisbon institutio-
nal architecture and the evolving direction of the CSDP. One week 
later, 12 member states loudly reiterated this call for a new set of 
procedures and guidelines. In response, the High Representative 
set up a working group. Led by Yves de Kermabon, a former KFOR 
commander and the first head of the EULEX Kosovo mission, this 
working group was tasked with elaborating proposals to this end. 
Simultaneously, the High Representative oversaw the establishment 
of a crisis response system that would allow the EEAS to frame these 
operation-oriented discussions in the broader strategic context of 
EU engagement. In October 2012, the Multilayer 2012 exercise was 
designed to test the new set-up. The overall CMP review is expected 
to lead to a consolidated document to be considered by member 
states early in 2013. 
This policy brief takes stock of the various proposals and formu-
lates a number of critical reflections. As a way forward, it princi-
pally advocates a more forthright discussion about the EU’s role in 
a world increasingly overcast by thunderclouds. At a time when the 
American commitment to underwriting European security is waning, 
the laudable adagio of comprehensive crisis management must not 
become a smokescreen masking inactivity. Trends of European 
prosperity and security are increasingly pointing downwards, and 
the CSDP must be recalibrated accordingly.
The ongoing review of the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures warrants 
attention. What passes as an update of an 
arcane and technical document masks a 
profoundly political debate concerning what 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
should be about. This policy brief summarises 
the main proposals and formulates a set of 
critical reflections. It calls for replacing the 
bureaucratic scheming with a more forthright 
political debate, and warns against sacrificing 
incompatible organisational cultures on the 
altar of the comprehensive approach. At a 
time when European security and prosperity 
trends are increasingly pointing downwards, 
the EEAS and the member states must look 
to the future and embrace, rather than resist, 
change.
The Kermabon Proposals
The CMP review process features a technical component as well 
as a political component: it is not only about updating proce-
dures but also about the political direction of the CSDP. The 
working group intended to deliver progress on multiple fronts. 
Firstly, it had the ambition to integrate the CSDP system in the 
broader EEAS toolkit in order to foster a ‘genuine comprehen-
sive approach’. Secondly, it aimed to speed up the planning pro-
cess by reducing the number of political decisions required for 
launching new operations whilst ensuring due political oversight 
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and control by the member states. Thirdly, it strived towards 
harmonising civilian and military processes and standardising 
the planning documentation through the use of new templates. 
Last but not least, it would seek a rapprochement between the 
strategic and operational levels by introducing a force sensing 
exercise as well as the involvement of the operational planning 
teams early on in the process. To this combined purpose, the 
Kermabon group floated a set of proposals, contained in a short 
document circulated in June 2012.
The most substantive change undoubtedly concerns the esta-
blishment of an ‘EU-wide strategic approach’. This first phase 
– preceding the adoption of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) 
– is meant to foster a more comprehensive and anticipatory po-
licy response to hot spots of instability. At the request of the 
member states or at the initiative of the High Representative, this 
would involve the drafting of a ‘strategic framework document’ 
articulating what the crisis is all about, why the EU should act 
and what response instruments are most suitable. This exercise 
would take place in the setting of the EEAS Crisis Management 
Board, which may decide to activate the so-called Crisis Platform 
as a central coordination tool. The underlying intent was to in-
stitutionalise the working method that was already pursued vis-
à-vis the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In both of these regions, 
CSDP action was accompanied by regional strategy documents 
that sought to weave together all strands of EU action. (For a cri-
tical analysis of the Sahel strategy, see Simon et al. 2012.) Such a 
strategic approach serves the twin purpose of embedding CSDP 
action within the EU foreign policy toolkit and fostering a culture 
of prudent planning.
The second major change the Kermabon group advocated con-
cerns the reduction of political decisions required throughout 
the CSDP planning cycle. This entailed a simplification of the 
old planning sequence, which on paper involved a Council de-
cision to act, a crisis management concept, strategic options, a 
Council decision on financing and command and control arran-
gements, an initiating directive for military operations, a concept 
of operations (CONOPS) and an operation plan (OPLAN). This was 
achieved by (a) considering the drafting of strategic options as 
an optional-step only pursued at the request of the CIVCOM or 
the EUMC; (b) approving the initiating military directive only at 
the level of the EUMC; and, (c) codifying the fast-track procedure 
of merging the CONOPS and OPLAN into a single document, the 
so-called CONOPS+. Last but not least, the overarching but often 
contentious ‘decision to act’ became merged into the ‘strategic 
approach’ discussion. As such, the overall number of political 
decision points drops from 7 to 4, or even 3 in the fast track 
mode. One must mention that this proposal already represented 
a political compromise: the early suggestion was to scrap the 
strategic options and initiating military directive altogether!
Buried within the discussion on the new planning sequence one 
finds a number of smaller changes. For example, the CMPD plan-
ning team in charge of writing the CMCs would be authorised to 
think outside of the narrow CSDP box when formulating propo-
sals. It would also become responsible for developing the stra-
tegic reviews leading to a transition from CSDP to Commission 
instruments. Both of these additional authorities are intended 
to foster greater synergies within the overall EU response. The 
CMC drafting stage, furthermore, would be structurally accom-
panied by a force sensing exercise to gauge the appetite of the 
member states for committing resources to a proposed CSDP 
engagement. Last but not least, the Civilian Operations Com-
mander (i.e. the CPCC Director) would become the owner of the 
civilian operation plans. This transforms the civilian OPLAN into 
a more political document, to be followed by a more detailed 
implementation plan drafted by the head of mission. This ef-
fectively strengthens the role of the operations commanders as 
‘gatekeepers’ responsible for safeguarding maximum latitude 
for heads of mission and force commanders – i.e. making the 
field level the supported command.
It can be observed that most of these changes are actually about 
codifying existing practices. In practice, most operation plan-
ning cycles have already seen one or more steps skipped. CMPD 
planners have been meshing their policy proposals within the 
broader toolkit for a long time: the Horn of Africa example pro-
vides sufficient proof of this. It can be rightly said that the new 
process simplifies matters, but the dynamics do not change fun-
damentally: the member states remain very much in the CSDP 
driving seat. Having said that, a number of observations can be 
made that should make member states think twice about the 
overall direction of the review.
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Critical Observations
Let us call a spade a spade. The CMP review is ultimately about 
the political direction of the CSDP. Firstly, the prominent call for 
a reduction of political decision points constitutes an attempt to 
rob the CSDP-reticent member states of the opportunity to pur-
sue bureaucratic delaying tactics. There is no functional logic to 
simplifying the process if one is earnest about the stated level of 
ambition of the CSDP: large-scale operations simply require a lot 
of staff work. Yet there is a clear political logic to pre-empting the 
deliberate stalling of the policy cycle. Such delaying tactics were 
part and parcel of, for example, the discussions about Operation 
Atalanta or what became the EUCAP Sahel mission. Policy spee-
ches frequently refer to the need for rapid-response, but the most 
recently launched CSDP missions have been on the drawing board 
for a longer time than Operation Overlord was in the making! At 
present, the debate about what the CSDP should be about is being 
conducted in the shadows. Different camps of member states are 
trying to torpedo each other’s ideas by playing bureaucratic cards. 
Surely this is not a healthy political debate.
Secondly, the proposal to establish an EU-wide strategic approach 
– commonsensical though it may seem – is being dragged along 
with this dynamic. Member states may rightfully question the va-
lue of such a document if in practice it is used as a mechanism for 
precluding rapid response. In order to avoid such a scenario, one 
can leave the drafting of the framework document entirely in the 
hands of the EEAS – i.e. without searching for consensual approval 
at the level of the 27. The problem in that case becomes that the 
overarching document guiding CSDP action may not have the sup-
port of all member states while the ensuing steps do require an 
overall consensus. In other words, the strategic approach discussi-
on creates an arena for the same difficult discussions to take place 
within the EEAS rather than in the PSC. The only helpful way out 
is to clearly ensure complementarity rather than overlap between 
the strategic framework document and the eventual CMC. The EU 
needs more regional strategies that provide a conceptual compass 
for CSDP action, but no one is served by a situation in which cri-
sis responses are developed in different committees. The uneasy 
coexistence between the CSDP structures and the managing direc-
torate for crisis response needs to be addressed: genuine rapid 
reaction requires a clear chain of command.
The streamlining of civilian and military processes, thirdly, remains 
largely limited to empty words. The fundamental issue is that the 
CSDP is built on a stovepiped system of mission planning: the 
pretension to plan comprehensively is largely abandoned once the 
CMC is approved. This stovepiping is built into the institutional 
preference for having separate command chains, but also into the 
financial arrangements. Civilian missions are resourced through 
the CFSP budget whereas the common costs of military operations 
are financed through the Athena mechanism (with individual costs 
laying where they fall). The breaking of these stovepipes could 
have been fundamentally addressed in the review of the Athena 
mechanism that was conducted a year earlier, but some mem-
ber states precluded any substantive progress on this front. The 
relatively small change of making the Civilian Operations Com-
mander responsible for drafting operation plans is therefore the 
only meagre point of progress on this front. It raises the question, 
however, to what extent member states and the Brussels insti-
tutions will be willing to delegate authority in a spirit of mission 
command.
Fourthly and finally, some attention is warranted to the doctrinal 
elaboration of the new way of planning CSDP engagements. Paral-
lel to the more political Kermabon proposals there is an ongoing 
push of staff efforts to update the planning templates and incor-
porate the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive – 
the new bible for strategic planners – into EU structures. In this 
regard, a few critical caveats are due. Some of the draft templates, 
for example, suggest codifying strategically nonsensical concepts 
into doctrine (such as the infamous end-date). Furthermore, one 
can ask why international organisations such as NATO and the 
EU remain committed to effects-based thinking when the original 
developers of this methodology have long since abandoned it (cf. 
Mattis 2008). The conceptual complexity of effects-based plan-
ning makes it an extremely resource-intensive undertaking and 
ultimately does not foster better staff work. Yet such pertinent 
debates in the EU seem to be conducted below the political radar 
and without the genuine involvement of the member states.
The Way Forward
In all these discussions, what member states seem to fear above 
all is change itself. This relates to the widespread perception that 
the Kermabon team held their cards too close to their chest. Yet 
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these fears are unwarranted: whatever the changes to the CSDP 
planning process, ultimate political control remains concentra-
ted in the hands of the member states. There is no real risk that 
the EEAS will take over or that individual member states will opti-
mise the mechanisms in order to upload their policy preferences. 
Such political games are easy enough to detect and will surely 
be blocked by the other actors involved. The more insidious risk, 
however, is that petty politics drown any appreciation of the big 
picture, namely that of a rapidly deteriorating European security 
environment. To that purpose, two major issues should be hee-
ded when the eventual CMP review gets adopted.
On the one hand, there is a real possibility that the horizontal 
integration of policy instruments in the name of comprehensive-
ness is complemented by a growing vertical disconnect within 
individual policy instruments. There are natural limits to the ex-
tent to which one can synchronise humanitarian efforts, deve-
lopment assistance and military operations because these instru-
ments serve fundamentally different policy purposes: to help, 
to build and to protect or destroy. Sometimes these go hand-in-
hand, sometimes they do not. The political drive to treat these 
instruments on the same level may ultimately lead to a situation 
where their organisational cultures may be merged horizontally 
but broken vertically. The EU must avoid sacrificing the impartial 
excellence of ECHO as well as its military teeth on the altar of the 
comprehensive approach.
On the other hand, the political debate about the direction of 
the CSDP cannot tolerate being all about how the EU structu-
res should be fine-tuned for the type of crises faced over the 
past two decades. The international order is characterised by 
new forms of geopolitical rivalry. Future crises will look less like 
Bosnia in the 1990s and more like Syria today. Yet the EU seems 
just as petrified now as it was twenty years ago. Allowing the 
EEAS and the CSDP to really live up to their potential means ac-
knowledging that the world is changing. Instability both within 
and beyond Europe is on the rise. The US is increasingly bent 
on making Europeans responsible for their own security. Fear 
of change will protect neither European interests nor European 
values. In this sense, member states should not dwell too long 
over accepting the Kermabon proposals. Whatever the procedu-
res are, they will in any case only serve as flexible guidelines. 
The more important matters surely lie elsewhere.
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